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Abstract
Researchers often face the problem of needing to protect the privacy of subjects while also needing
to integrate data that contains personal information from diverse data sources in order to conduct their
research. The advent of computational social science and the enormous amount of data about people
that is being collected makes protecting the privacy of research subjects evermore important. However,
strict privacy procedures can make joining diverse sources of data that contain information about specific
individual behaviors difficult. In this paper we present a procedure to keep information about specific
individuals from being “leaked“ or shared in either direction between two sources of data. To achieve this
goal, we randomly assign individuals to anonymous groups before combining the anonymized information
between the two sources of data. We refer to this method as the YahtzeeTMprocedure, and show that it
performs as expected theoretically when we apply it to data from Facebook and public voter records.
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1 Introduction
Computational social science is an emergent field of inquiry that promises to revolutionize the way we study
and understand human behavior (2, 8). Unfortunately, obstacles exist that hamper analysis of large-scale
dynamic data sets that are now available (8). One problem is that companies such as Google, Facebook, and
cell phone companies, are often reluctant to share data obtained from their clients with external researchers.
When they do allow access to the data, it is often in an aggregated or anonymized format designed to
protect the identities of their users. While this approach has led to a variety of collaborative research
projects (7), once identifying information is removed from the data it cannot be combined with other data
sources, limiting the type and scope of research that can be performed with such data. This paper presents
a procedure designed to address this issue by keeping information about specific individuals private while
still allowing researchers to combine multiple sources of information in such a way that inferences may be
drawn about the relationships between variables across sets of data.
We developed this method in order to join information from public voting records with data we are
analyzing through a collaborative research project with Facebook (1). Although our human subjects protocol
approved by the Institutional Review Board at the University of California, San Diego, allows us to perform
one-to-one matching of Facebook data and voter records, Facebook asked us to design a procedure that
would better protect the privacy of its users. So, in order to study the voting behavior of users, it was
necessary to devise a process for matching users to their publicly available voting records without identifying
the behavior of specific users.
In this process, we wanted to be sure that information about specific individuals was not “leaked” or
shared in either direction. Our goal was to avoid connecting any specific Facebook user’s voting behavior
to Facebook’s database of information about a given user. To achieve this goal, we devised a group-level
matching procedure that computed the relationship between site usage behavior and voting behavior based
on repeated random assignment of individuals to groups, as we describe below.
2 Group-Level Anonymous Matching
In order to begin the procedure, we needed a unique identifier for each individual that could be obtained
using information in either the Facebook data or the voting record data. We used first name, last name, and
date of birth (dropping all instances that had duplicates) for the voting records of one state to generate an
encrypted one-way hash (we used the last 7 digits of SHA-256).
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A “match” is defined as a row in both files that has the same values across files for ALL of these columns:
first name, last name, birth day, birth month, birth year. Duplicate rows in both files are thrown out
before any matching begins. Approximately 0.5% of Facebook users were dropped due to duplication and
also approximately 0.5% of voters from the voter files were dropped due to duplication.
The hash takes a string of text (in this case the first name, last name, and date of birth of the user)
and returns a 256 bit string that can be treated as a numeric value. We divided this value by N/g, where
N is the number of individuals in the public voter record and g=5 was chosen arbitrarily, and recorded the
remainder as the group ID. This procedure results in groups of various sizes, but on average, groups will be
of size g. Sampling variation caused some groups to have more or fewer than g people in them; these groups
were discarded. We then recorded the number of voters in each retained group, along with its group ID.
Groups could have between 0 and g voters in them, and the mean number of voters per group approximated
the average turnout in the state, with a very small amount of sampling variation due to groups with more
or less than g individuals being discarded.
Facebook hashed the user record data (with the same sequence of random seeds), using first name, last
name, and date of birth (also dropping duplicates) for users who logged in from the state in question on
Election Day. The Facebook data does not have first name and last name columns, but it does have a
name column that contains the name provided by the user at time of registration. We defined first name as
the first token in name and last name as the last token in“name”. This works well because most people enter
their name such as “First M. Last”. However, it does not work if the name is entered as “The Illustrious
First M. Last, Esquire,” which occasionally happens online.
Facebook then divided the hash value derived from each name and birthdate by N/g in order to create a
group ID (note that N still represents the number of individuals in the public voter record, not the number
of individuals Facebook recorded as logging in from that state). This procedure is identical to the procedure
used to create group IDs using public voting records. Therefore, individuals with the same first name, last
name, and date of birth in both the public voting records and Facebook’s data were assigned the same group
ID. That is, this procedure guaranteed that any and all Facebook users who were also registered voters
would be assigned the same group ID in both sets of data. However, because there was no guarantee that a
given registered voter would also be a Facebook user nor that a given Facebook user would be registered to
vote (and therefore in the voter record), this procedure prevented identification of a specific Facebook user’s
behavior. The proportion of truly matched Facebook users in any group was unknown and could range from
0% to 100%.
2
Using the state voting data, the number of registered voters in each group who did vote (some number
between 0 and g) in 2010 was calculated. That number was recorded and assigned to each Facebook user
with the same group ID. Importantly, a Facebook user was assigned to a group whether or not they were
on the registration list. The group may have had any number of voters (0 to g). So, in a given instance a
user who was not on the registration list may be assigned to a group in which any fraction of those on the
registration list voted. This feature of the procedure ensures that we cannot be certain that a particular
Facebook user registered or voted based on the turnout value of their assigned group.
We repeated this procedure m times, re-hashing using different seeds (and thus re-grouping individuals),
and assigning an additional value to each user after every round. (This gave rise to our nickname for the
procedure, “YahtzeeTM”, which refers to the idea of metaphorically re-rolling the dice on each iteration
to place users in new groups.) Thus, each user was assigned a distribution of m values, from the set
y ∈ {0, 1, . . . , g}. If g > 1 then it is not possible to infer with certainty the voting behavior of any users, or
even their registration status. However, given the distribution of these values, each additional draw provides
more information and we can set m such that we have enough observations per person to classify individuals
on Facebook as matched voters or matched abstainers with a minimum pre-determined level of measurement
error (we chose a value of 5%).
To see why, notice that Facebook users who were not registered to vote would have an effectively random
classification in every round. They are also randomly assigned to groups that have a random number of
voters and abstainers in them. Therefore, if p is equal to the turnout rate, then the probability that the jth
draw for user i is equal to y can be determined from a binomial distribution:
Pr(yij = y) =
(
g
y
)
py(1− p)(g−y). (1)
Meanwhile, users who were registered to vote would be somewhat more likely to have the correct classification
(voter or abstainer). Given that the user was on the registration list, their presence in their own group in
each draw skews the distribution of their own draws (toward g for voters and toward 0 for abstainers).
Specifically, if a Facebook record does match a voter record, then its own contribution to the total
number of voters in the group is always 1, and since the other g − 1 group members are randomly assigned,
the probability that a draw is equal to y is
Pr(yij = y) =
(
g − 1
y − 1
)
py−1(1− p)(g−y−1). (2)
3
By the same reasoning, if a Facebook record matches an abstainer record, then its own contribution to the
total number of voters in the group is always 0, and the probability that a draw is equal to y is simply
Pr(yij = y) =
(
g − 1
y
)
py(1− p)(g−1−y). (3)
Since these are independent draws, the probability of observing the set of draws yi conditional on being
unregistered, a voter, or an abstainer is
Pr(yi|i is unregistered) =
m∏
j=1
(
g
yij
)
pyij (1− p)(g−yij) (4)
Pr(yi|i is a voter) =
m∏
j=1
(
g − 1
yij − 1
)
pyij−1(1− p)(g−yij−1) (5)
Pr(yi|i is an abstainer) =
m∏
j=1
(
g − 1
yij
)
pyij (1− p)(g−yij−1). (6)
We can use these probabilities to classify individuals, assigning each to the classification that maximizes
the likelihood of observing yi. For improved efficiency we transform the equations to log likelihoods, and we
use simulations to estimate the number of values needed per record (m) to generate a specific classification
error. Simulation code (written in R) is provided below.
For any application, we must select two values of m for each set of records that we wish to match in order
to balance the rate of false voters and false abstainers. This is because the overall turnout rate determines
which behavior takes fewer observations to distinguish from average behavior. If most people abstained, it
will take fewer observations to identify groups where users likely voted, and vice versa. We therefore must
make additional draws for individuals classified as belonging to the more common group. To achieve balanced
rates we select two values: m1 is the number of draws necessary to reach the desired level of accuracy for
the less common behavior and m2 is the number of additional draws necessary to reach the desired level of
accuracy for all individuals classified with the more common behavior after m1 draws.
Choosing m1 and m2 requires knowledge of the aggregate turnout rate, which was computed directly from
the voter record. It also requires knowledge of the match rate (the probability a given Facebook record can
be matched to a specific voter record). For each state, Facebook estimated the match rate by drawing 1000
records at random from their database, and counting the number of matches with a list of the names and
birthdates that were available in the voter record. No individual match was recorded: Only the aggregate
match rate was stored, and all other information was discarded.
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In order to test the method we simulated the matching procedure using a set match rate that approximates
what we observed in the 13 states that we used to match voter data (30%). We also set the turnout level to
match each state in order to assess the prediction error associated with a given number of draws. The results
of these simulations are summarized by Figure 1. The simulations show that the less common behavior takes
fewer observations to classify individuals with a given level of confidence, and that as the turnout moves away
from 50%, more observations (m2) are needed to reach the level of confidence of the less common behavior.
It is important to note, once again, that the procedure only gives us estimates of the probability that any
given Facebook user is on the registration list and estimates of their voting behavior. We can not be certain
whether or not a user is on the list, has voted, or has abstained from these draws. In fact, it is possible that a
voter will be classified as an abstainer or the reverse. The number of draws is chosen such that classifications
of this type are unlikely, but still possible. Using m1 and m2 we are able to set the measurement error level
(in our case 95%) that we determined would be an appropriate balance between capability of inference and
protection of privacy of users. In other research applications a higher or lower level of measurement error
may be desired, which can easily be achieved by adjusting m1 and m2 accordingly.
3 Validation
To choose which states to validate, we identified those that provided (for research purposes) first names, last
names, and full birth dates in publicly available voting records. From these, we chose a set that minimized
cost per population. Of these states, the cost of voting records varied from $0 to $1500 per state. Costs
were even greater in other states. We excluded records from Texas because they systematically excluded
some individuals from their voting records (specifically, they did not report on the voting behavior of people
that had abstained in the four prior elections). The resulting list of states included Arkansas, California,
Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
and Rhode Island, and yielded 6,338,882 records of voters and abstainers. This value reflects the fact that
we obtained about 1/3 of all voter records in the U.S., and of those, about 1/3 matched to the 61 million
users who logged in on Election Day.
To validate the YahtzeeTMprocess, we compared its classifications for a small set of randomly chosen
records for each state to true voting behavior. Table 1 contains the m1 and m2 values for each state.
These values were chosen by adjusting the m1 and m2 values in the simulation code in the Appendix until
values yielding approximately 95% accuracy were found. As seen in the table, the values for m1 and m2
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vary considerably. The variation in m1 is due in large part to variation in the match rate. A lower match
rate requires more draws overall in order to distinguish those on the registration list from those not on the
registration list. Variation in m2 is primarily due to variation in the turnout rate in the states. States that
have a turnout rate near 50% (such as Florida and Kansas) take few extra observations to distinguish the
less common behavior from those who are assigned values at random, while states with a turnout rate far
from 50% (such as Arkansas and New Jersey) require many extra draws to make such distinctions.
Table 2 shows conditional probabilities generated from truth tables for the YahtzeeTMclassifier results.
For each state, 1000 Facebook user records were chosen at random. Each was given a classification based
on the YahtzeeTMprocess. The truth tables contained the frequency of each classification that was assigned
to each true behavior. This information was used to calculate the classification accuracy in the categories
of interest (voter or abstainer), which are displayed for each state in Table 2. We also calculated the 95%
confidence interval for a null hypothesis that the prediction is correct 95% of the time (based on an assumption
the successes are binomially distributed from the same number of draws observed). Note that nearly all of
the confidence intervals contain the observed data, suggesting that deviations from 95% accuracy are due to
sampling variation.
Researchers interested in this procedure have the ability to increase or decrease the accuracy of the group
level matching procedure by increasing or decreasing the number of observations generated for each user. At
the limit (extremely high values of m1 and/or m2) researchers have the ability to draw enough observations
that they are extremely confident about the true behavior of users, but because of the group-level matching
nature of the procedure, they will still never be 100% certain of an individual’s behavior.
In addition to estimates of the voting behavior of individuals, the procedure gives us estimates of the
probability that an individual is on the voting record at all. As Table 2 shows, there is approximately a 99%
chance that when we do not find a match for a user that there was not a match for that individual on that
state’s voting record. However, we required a perfect match for first name, last name, and birthdate. Thus,
while we might be nearly certain that there was no match, the presence of nicknames, variation in reported
birth date, and other errors in the data mean that unmatched users might actually be in the voter record.
So this confidence level is an upper bound and the probability that a user is not in the record given that
we classified them as not matched is probably lower than 99%. This means that interpretations of analyses
based on the unmatched classification should be careful to describe them as measuring the match rate rather
than measuring the exact likelihood that a given user was in the record. It also means that user privacy is
more protected by uncertainty since there is a greater chance that they were actually in the record when the
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procedure classifies them as unmatched.
Although there may be important systematic differences between users with matchable and unmatchable
records, our results suggest the difference is not large. Figure 2 shows that there is a good fit between the
turnout rate of matched Facebook users and the overall turnout rate of each state. This positive relationship
suggests that the matching procedure is producing reliable estimates of turnout for matched users at an
aggregate level. However, the relationship is not perfect for at least two reasons. First, Facebook users
within a given state are not necessarily a representative sample of that state’s population. For example, we
know that the age of Facebook users skews toward younger people. Second, matched users are not necessarily
representative of all Facebook users, including those who could not be matched. For example, people who use
exotic nicknames may have personality traits that also affect their willingness to vote. Thus, while the good
aggregate level fit is suggestive, we should be cautious when describing our results to explain the limitations
of out-of-sample inferences that might be made using the matched data.
About 1 in 3 users were successfully matched by the YahtzeeTMprocess (note that success depends on
many factors, including voting eligibility, rates of registration, and so on). Although the match rate for this
study is lower than the match rates in many other GOTV studies (which is usually about 50%), this may
be due to the demographic composition of Facebook. In Figure 3 we show how the probability of matching
varies by age. There is a positive relationship between age and the probability of matching the voting record
through approximately age 80 (as seen by the positive slope of the triangles). While there is a drop off in
the probability of obtaining matches for users over the age of 80, it is important to note that there are very
few Facebook users in this age group (as seen by the left skew of the diamonds). Younger users are also
more difficult to match, likely because fewer of them are registered, and even those who are registered may
be accessing Facebook from an out-of-state college. Older Facebook users are easier to match, but there are
fewer of them.
Because we know that the matched sample is not representative of the overall population by age, we
assessed the turnout rate of the matched Facebook user sample as it compared to the turnout rate of
each states by age. Figure 4 shows that the turnout rate goes up among older users and declines with
advanced age in both the matched sample and the voter records for each state. These results suggest that
the matching procedure correctly identifies voters and abstainers and that once we control for the skew in
the age distribution of the matched sample, the voting behavior of Facebook users is not very different from
that of the population overall.
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4 Discussion
Here we have introduced a method of group-level matching that allows researchers to merge two data sources
while respecting the privacy of individuals in the constituent data sets. Methods like these are essential for
researchers who are interested in making inferences that draw upon data about individuals, while also
respecting the privacy of individuals (and the privacy policies of entities that collect such data). Many
extraordinary research projects could be enhanced by joining their data with other sources of individual
information. For example, one project collected 509 million twitter messages from 2.4 million individuals
from 84 countries between February 2008 and January 2010 (5). Other studies include an analysis of the mood
within America as function of date and time using 300 million twitter messages generated between September
2006 and August 2009 (10), an analysis of 50 million Google search queries to identify the weekly influenza
level in regions of the United States (4), and an analysis of the application adoption patterns of 50 million
Facebook users (11). In each of these studies however, a variety of additional questions could be addressed
if more information about the users generating the observed data could be obtained. This information often
exists in other datasets yet linking these datasets raises both technical and ethical concerns.
To address these issues we have developed a method to anonymously match group level information. This
method is different from other “privacy preserving” machine learning techniques in that it joins information
about individuals from at least two sources (9). “Privacy preserving” machine learning techniques pool
similar data from multiple sources. The “YahtzeeTM“ procedure also does not rely on a third party function
to join the constituent datasets as some other procedures do (3). For a review of other computational
methods for ensuring case level anonymity see (6). The advantage of the “YahtzeeTM“ procedure is that
no party ever needs to know certain information about a specific individual because this information is
anonymized prior to merging the constituent datasets. The YahtzeeTMprocedure can therefore be used to
preprocess a dataset before it is ever sent to another organization for analysis. Thus, multiple data collecting
entities can use this procedure to anonymize their data before combining that data with other sources for
joint analysis.
We used the YahtzeeTMmethod to match public voting records to Facebook user data. This application
allowed us to test our method on real world data, where we found that it generates the same level of
uncertainty about individual records that was predicted by theory. Additionally, we found that the turnout
rate of Facebook users by state strongly correlates with the overall turnout rate of all individuals in the state
and Facebook users within each age group tend to vote at about the same rate as members of those age
groups in the population as a whole. These results not only suggest that the YahtzeeTMmethod works as
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expected, but also that Facebook users are very similar to the population as a whole in terms of their voting
behavior. This should be an encouraging result for a growing group of researchers who rely on internet
websites such as Facebook or Amazon’s Mechanical Turk in order to recruit subjects.
We live in an age in which more and more data is being collected about individuals, providing researchers
with the opportunities to study phenomena at a scale never possible before and to study new relationships
that were infeasible before due to the difficulty of collecting information from diverse sources about the same
individuals. While the availability of this data offers exciting opportunities for new avenues of research, much
of it is held by corporations that have an interest in maintaining the privacy of their users or customers.
In order for researchers to conduct studies using this data, new methods will need to be invented that fit
specific problems with the data. In this paper, we offer a solution to what we believe is a common problem
that corporations and researchers often face, matching sensitive data to other data sources.
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5 Appendix
5.1 R Code Part 1
t<-0.45 # turnout rate
mm<-0.3 # match rate
n<-100000 # total sample
g<-5 # group size
m<-56 # observations per person
m2<-27 # additional observations per person to eliminate asymmetry
n0<-round(mm*(1-t)*n) # number of matched abstainers
n1<-round(mm*t*n) # number of matched voters
n2<-n-n0-n1 # number of mismatched
# 0 = matched abstainer, 1 = matched voter, 2 = mismatched
type<-c(rep(0,n0),rep(1,n1),rep(2,n2))
# generate matched abstainer observations
y0<-matrix(rbinom(n0*m,g-1,t),ncol=m)
# generate matched voter observations
y1<-matrix(rbinom(n1*m,g-1,t)+1,ncol=m)
# generate mismatched observations
y2<-matrix(rbinom(n2*m,g,t),ncol=m)
# join groups
y<-rbind(y0,y1,y2)
# initialize prediction vector
pred_type<-rep(NA,n)
# loop through each person to predict type and probabilities
for(i in 1:n) {
pred_type[i]<-which.max(c(sum(dbinom(y[i,], g-1,t, log=T)),
sum(dbinom(y[i,]-1,g-1,t, log=T)),
sum(dbinom(y[i,], g, t, log=T))))-1
}
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5.2 R Code Part 2
# redraw the less frequent types to increase accuracy
if(m2>0) {
# identify redo set
redo_set<-which(pred_type==ifelse(t<0.5,0,1))
# generate more matched abstainer observations
yy0<-matrix(rbinom(n0*m2,g-1,t),ncol=m2)
# generate more matched voter observations
yy1<-matrix(rbinom(n1*m2,g-1,t)+1,ncol=m2)
# generate more mismatched observations
yy2<-matrix(rbinom(n2*m2,g,t),ncol=m2)
# join groups
yy<-rbind(yy0,yy1,yy2)
# loop through each person in redo set to predict type
for(i in redo_set) {
pred_type[i]<-which.max(c(sum(dbinom(c(y[i,],yy[i,]), g-1,t, log=T)),
sum(dbinom(c(y[i,],yy[i,])-1,g-1,t, log=T)),
sum(dbinom(c(y[i,],yy[i,]), g, t, log=T))))-1
}
}
# probability predicted matched abstainer is correctly identified
sum(pred_type==0&type==0)/sum(pred_type==0)
# probability predicted matched voter is correctly identified
sum(pred_type==1&type==1)/sum(pred_type==1)
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Figure 1: The proportion of correct predictions for participation rates of 30%, 45%, 55%, and 70% (the
match rate is held constant at 30% in all four figures) from a simulation of the matching procedure. The
dark line represents the accuracy rate for true participators. The light line represents the accuracy rate for
true abstainers. accuracy increases for both categories as observations for each individual are obtained from
the YahtzeeTMprocedure. Note that the less common of the two behaviors requires fewer observations for
classification than the more common behavior. m1 is the number of observations per person necessary to
achieve a given level of accuracy for the less common behavior and m1 + m2 is the number of observations
necessary to achieve a given level of accuracy for the more common behavior.
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Figure 2: The proportion of matched users who turned out to vote compared to the overall turnout rate by
state. Note that the abbreviation for Kansas is repositioned slightly so that it does not overlap with the
abbreviation for Florida. The results show that the YahtzeeTMprocedure produces about the same overall
turnout rates for each state as those shown in the voter record.
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Figure 3: The proportion of Facebook users that were matched to the validated voting record by age
(triangles) and each age group’s proportion of the largest age group, those 20 years of age at the time of the
election (diamonds). This figure helps to explain why match rates are lower for Facebook users who tend to
be younger and more difficult to match than the average registered voter.
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Figure 4: The proportion of matched users who turned out to vote by age. The orange line represents the
turnout rate by age of the matched sample of Facebook users. Each gray line represents the turnout rate by
age of a state voter record. The results show that users on Facebook exhibit the same pattern of turnout
with respect to age as the populations in other states.
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State m1 m2 Common Type
Arkansas 55 45 Voters
California 50 50 Voters
Connecticut 65 10 Voters
Florida 75 0 Abstainers
Kansas 75 0 Abstainers
Kentucky 60 5 Voters
Missouri 70 20 Abstainers
New Jersey 60 65 Abstainers
Nevada 65 25 Voters
New York 55 50 Abstainers
Oklahoma 65 15 Abstainers
Pennsylvania 65 15 Voters
Rhode Island 75 5 Abstainers
Table 1: m1 is the number of draws necessary to reach the desired level of accuracy for the more common
behavioral type and m2 is the number of additional draws necessary to reach the desired level of accuracy
for the less common behavioral type.
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State Pr() 95% CI
Pr(Abs|Class=Abs) 0.949 [0.908, 0.990]
Arkansas Pr(Vot|Class=Vot) 0.957 [0.913, 0.981]
Pr(NM|Class=NM) 0.988
Pr(Abs|Class=Abs) 0.932 [0.912, 0.980]
California Pr(Vot|Class=Vot) 0.951 [0.919, 0.978]
Pr(NM|Class=NM) 0.987
Pr(Abs|Class=Abs) 0.888 [0.916, 0.978]
Connecticut Pr(Vot|Class=Vot) 0.988 [0.912, 0.981]
Pr(NM|Class=NM) 0.994
Pr(Abs|Class=Abs) 0.937 [0.914, 0.977]
Florida Pr(Vot|Class=Vot) 0.970 [0.917, 0.982]
Pr(NM|Class=NM) 0.998
Pr(Abs|Class=Abs) 0.928 [0.915, 0.980]
Kansas Pr(Vot|Class=Vot) 0.953 [0.918, 0.982]
Pr(NM|Class=NM) 0.996
Pr(Abs|Class=Abs) 0.907 [0.921, 0.978]
Kentucky Pr(Vot|Class=Vot) 0.974 [0.921, 0.978]
Pr(NM|Class=NM) 0.993
Pr(Abs|Class=Abs) 0.979 [0.915, 0.986]
Missouri Pr(Vot|Class=Vot) 0.947 [0.904, 0.982]
Pr(NM|Class=NM) 0.999
Pr(Abs|Class=Abs) 0.945 [0.908, 0.991]
New Jersey Pr(Vot|Class=Vot) 1.000 [0.895, 0.987]
Pr(NM|Class=NM) 0.999
Pr(Abs|Class=Abs) 0.970 [0.917, 0.982]
New York Pr(Vot|Class=Vot) 0.947 [0.908, 0.985]
Pr(NM|Class=NM) 0.987
Pr(Abs|Class=Abs) 0.941 [0.911, 0.985]
Nevada Pr(Vot|Class=Vot) 0.963 [0.915, 0.982]
Pr(NM|Class=NM) 0.996
Pr(Abs|Class=Abs) 0.950 [0.914, 0.986]
Oklahoma Pr(Vot|Class=Vot) 0.940 [0.920, 0.980]
Pr(NM|Class=NM) 0.998
Pr(Abs|Class=Abs) 0.975 [0.912, 0.981]
Pennsylvania Pr(Vot|Class=Vot) 0.971 [0.914, 0.986]
Pr(NM|Class=NM) 0.994
Pr(Abs|Class=Abs) 0.972 [0.908, 0.979]
Rhode Island Pr(Vot|Class=Vot) 0.953 [0.912, 0.980]
Pr(NM|Class=NM) 0.997
Table 2: YahtzeeTMclassifier results from 1000 randomly selected Facebook users from each state. Each user
was given a classification based on the YahtzeeTMprocess. “Abs” = Abstainer, “Vot” = Voter, “NM” =
Not Matched. The conditional probabilities are calculated as the probability of observing a true behavior
conditional on the YahtzeeTMclassification. The 95% confidence intervals are for the null distribution of 95%
accuracy in the classification, calculated from a binomial distribution with the same number of draws in
each category. In total, 22 of the 26 tests fall within these intervals, suggesting that deviations from 95%
accuracy are due to sampling variation, and for a large sample the procedure will generate the desired level
of accuracy.
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